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2Geography and Marketing Strategy in Consumer Packaged Goods
Abstract
As i g n i ﬁcant portion of academic research on marketing strategy focuses on how national brands
of repeat-purchase goods are managed or should be managed. Surprisingly little consideration is
given in this tradition to the extended role of geography, i.e., distance and space. For instance,
manufacturers of brands in non-durable product categories are well aware of the fact that their
national brands perform very diﬀerent across domestic US markets. This holds even for product
categories with limited product diﬀerentiation. In this chapter, we outline various processes through
which the inﬂuence of geography on performance of national brands materializes. We discuss a
number of alternative explanations for the emergence and sustenance of spatial concentration of
market shares. Several of these explanations are modeled empirically using data from the United
States packaged goods industry. This chapter closes with avenues for further academic research on
spatial aspects of the growth of new products.
Keywords: Multi-market competition, retailing, vertical channel competition, spatial analysis, net-
work analysis.
31 Introduction
Geography has become an important practical component of marketing strategy. This is driven to a
large extent by organizational expansion goals that force managers to take into account increasingly
more complex spatial delivery and advertising systems during the launch and management of new
products.
In step with this trend, researchers in marketing and economics have developed an interest in
the spatial aspects of growth and market structure. The resulting research tradition has been called
the “new economic geography.” This research stream — which started in the 1970s in the ﬁeld of
industrial organization — is aimed at answering two questions (Fujita, Krugman and Venables 1999)
• When is a symmetric equilibrium, without spatial concentration, unstable?
• When is a spatial concentration of economic activity sustainable?
The main goal of the ”new economic geography” is thus to describe competitive processes driving
the growth and subsequent stability of spatial concentration in economic activity (Bonanno 1990,
Fujita and Thisse 2002). In spirit of these two central questions, this chapter is concerned with
the empirical stylized fact that market shares of undiﬀerentiated packaged goods (e.g., food or
convenience items) are spatially concentrated. To this end, we outline empirical and analytical models
of spatial concentration and growth in the context of packaged goods even when such goods are not
meaningfully diﬀerentiated. Using these models, we speculate on the reasons why strong spatial
concentration in market shares emerges for undiﬀerentiated goods, and we oﬀer several explanations
for why such concentration, once established, tends to persist.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we commence by looking
at some of the basic reasons for why market outcomes in packaged goods should be expected to be
spatially dependent and outline some of the geographical aspects of the distribution and advertising
infrastructure needed to connect manufacturers and consumers. Then we describe various methods
to account for the spatial market-dependence that is caused by this infrastructure. In this section, we
also oﬀer a small empirical example of how spatial concentration in market shares can be accounted
for. Section 4, focuses on the ﬁrst question above and outlines two path-dependent processes that
create spatial concentration of outcomes. Section 5 focuses on the second question and discusses
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Figure 1: Examples of retailer trade-areas
several strategic competitive processes that tend to enforce spatial concentration across time and
explain why spatial concentration persists. We conclude with directions for future research.
2 Geographical aspects of marketing strategy
Two spatially relevant dimensions of new product strategy are distribution and advertising. These
two factors are controlled by manufacturers at diﬀerent levels of spatial aggregation and cause mar-
keting strategies as well as their outcomes to be linked through space. Therefore, when investigating
the spatial concentration of market shares, it is useful to commence by looking at how distribution
and communication channels are structured geographically.
The geographical organization of distribution channels Distribution channels of consumer goods
in the United States consist of multiple hierarchical participants such as manufacturers, wholesalers,
and retailers. Research in marketing and economics has studied the vertical structure of channels,
i.e., the desirability and stability of vertical intermediation, in a single market (e.g., McGuire and
Staelin 1983). However, in this literature the impact of the geographical organization of distribution
channels has not been studied.
5A geographical aspect of this organization is the structure of retail trade areas. This structure
is important to manufacturers because the retailers control the choice environment of consumers at
the point of purchase to a large extent. It is therefore likely that observed spatial pricing policies
have a component that reﬂects the geographic nature of the retail trade and that observed sales data
have a component that reﬂects the unobserved retailer activity such as shelf-space allocations (see
also Bronnenberg and Mahajan 2001).
Another geographical aspect of the distribution channel is that the inﬂuence of a single retailer
can extend beyond its own trade area. This is because retailers compete and often mimic each
other’s successful programs. To capture the inﬂuence of retailer competition, it is useful to look at
how retail trade areas overlap. To exemplify this, Figure (1) visualizes trade areas of a selection of
United States retailers.1 Panel (a) shows the trade area of Albertsons, a large US chain of grocery
stores. The trade area of retailer (b), Safeway, coincides largely with that of (a) Albertsons but
not at all with that of retailer (d), Kroger. From a competitive perspective, it is therefore likely
that for instance Albertsons and Safeway in Figure (1) compete more directly than say Safeway and
Kroger. We will subsequently use trade area overlap to deﬁne competitive “closeness” in a network
of retailers (see also Baum and Singh 1994)
The geographical organization of media and communication channels In addition to distribu-
tion channels, communication channels also have a distinct spatial organization. For instance, TV
communication channels are organized in so-called advertising markets or Designated Market Areas
(DMA’s).
Nielsen Media Research constructs DMA’s by grouping all counties whose largest viewing share
is with the same TV stations. For instance, the New York advertising market or DMA consists of
all counties where the New York TV stations attract the largest viewing share. DMA’s are non-
overlapping and cover all of the continental United States, Hawaii and parts of Alaska. In total, the
US consists of 210 DMA’s. The Nielsen company tracks viewing habits at the individual level for all
of these 210 DMA’s. Additionally, daily household level viewing data are collected for about 55 of
the largest DMA’s.
The geographical structure of DMA’s is important to manufacturers because their TV advertising
decisions are forcibly made at the DMA level. This creates dependence between two markets that
are part of the same DMA.
1Figure 1 visualizes the trade areas of chains, but not of their subsidiaries.
6In sum, distribution and communication channels are are controlled by manufacturers at diﬀerent
levels of spatial aggregation. For the purpose of delivering goods physically to the customer, a spatial
control unit often is the trade area of a retail chain.2 For the purpose of making the consumer aware
of the product, an advertising market or DMA is a relevant spatial control unit. These units need not
be (and usually are not) the same. Managerially, this causes an interesting control problem because
these diﬀerent units cause distribution and awareness creating policies to interact in a complicated
way. Additionally, from an empirical modeling perspective, the diﬀerences in control units will need
to be accounted for when modeling data from a cross-section of locations.
3R e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d m e a s u r e m ent of spatial concentration
In this section, we outline several empirical models to measure spatial concentration in brand-level
market outcomes. These models combine data at the retailer, DMA, and market level.
3.1 The geographical concept of a market.
For empirical and economic purposes in the analysis of packaged goods, it is helpful to ﬁrst deﬁne an
elementary spatial unit of analysis that can be used in the empirical analysis of both the distribution
as well as the communication channels. We use the concept of a geographical “market.” The term
“market” is routinely used in the research and practice of the economic sciences, however it often lacks
af o r m a ld e ﬁnition. In the interest of modeling the potential strategic use of space in an economic
context, we believe that a useful deﬁnition of a “geographic market” is implied by spatial limits on
consumer arbitrage. In such a deﬁnition, two markets are separated if consumers are unwilling to
invest time or resources in travel to beneﬁt from potential price diﬀerences across geography. For
instance, Los Angeles and New York are two diﬀerent markets for consumer non-durable goods (e.g.,
food items), because consumers in Los Angeles do not travel to New York to beneﬁtf r o md e a l so n
such products. On the other hand Los Angeles and New York can be part of the same market in the
context of goods that are more expensive.
An interesting aspect of the U.S. geography is that it consists by and large of population centers
with relatively empty space in between (see e.g., Greenhut 1981). This obviously helps the geographic
2During the introduction of new products, ﬁrms are often additionally interested in retailer adoption at the market
level. The same holds for retailers that have very large trade areas. Some of these larger retailers have spatial control
units themselves, e.g., the Albertsons supermarket chain is organized in various geographical clusters.




Figure 2: Part of the U.S. retail network, with linkages based on common trade-areas
deﬁnition of markets. Large marketing research ﬁrms such as AC Nielsen and Information Resources
Incorporated (IRI) sample selectively from such markets to provide sales and marketing data for
consumers goods that cover the entire United States (see, e.g., Figure 1 for an example of the spatial
sample design that is used by such marketing research ﬁrms).
3.2 Modeling distribution networks
With consumer markets characterized as a set of locations, the inﬂuence of distribution and adver-
tising decisions on the consumers in these markets can be represented using networks. For instance,
consider a consumer product that is distributed through retail chains. The mere fact that manufac-
turers use retailers for the distribution of their brands causes the data to be related across markets in
at least two ways. First, United States retailers are present in multiple markets. Second, in addition
to multimarket presence,retailers inﬂuence each other. For example, retailers with overlapping trade
areas compete for the same consumers.
To model the inﬂuence among retailers, we specify a network of retailers. In this network, retailers
who’s trade areas overlap are connected.Using Figure 1 as an example, the subset of six retailers can
thus be represented as a sociogram or a graph. Figure 2 shows this graph representation.
The arcs between the retailers can be modeled based on the context at hand. Bronnenberg and
Sismeiro (2002) for instance use bi-directional arcs, and a measure based the importance of trade
area overlap. Speciﬁcally, let any given retailer r have a trade area Tr consisting of all markets in
which r operates. The total dollar amount sold through a retailer r in a given market m is called “all
commodity volume” of r in m or simply ACVrm. We use the ACV share of retailer r0 in the trade
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This measure sums to 1 across all direct competitors r0 of retailer r. Using these weights, the
representation of the complete retailer network is a sparse weight matrix W of dimension K × K
who’s elements are arranged as follows:
W =

   

0 w2→1 ··· wK→1





w1→K w2→K ··· 0

   

(2)
This matrix is sparse because many pairs of retailers do not have overlapping trade areas. Further,
the matrix W is asymmetric and can express that the inﬂuence of one retailer on the other is larger
than vice versa. For any retailer, the deﬁnition of wr0→r is sensitive to both the size of a given
competitor, as well as to the number of markets in which they both meet. For instance, H-E-B
in Texas competes in only a small part of the trade area of Albertsons. Albertsons, on the other
hand, is present in the entire trade area of H-E-B. Therefore, all else equal and because of its limited
scope, the inﬂuence of H-E-B on Albertsons, is modeled to be less than the inﬂuence of Albertsons
on H-E-B. Alternative measures of wr0→r can be formulated to account for interactions between the
ACV of r0 and r.
3.3 Mapping retailer networks to consumer markets
It is often of interest to analyze the performance of products at the market level. It would seem
at ﬁrst glance that the absence of consumer arbitrage across markets allows researchers to analyze
markets independently. However, it is easy to see that this is only eﬃcient if the analyst observes
all demand-relevant information about distribution and advertising. This is normally not the case.
For instance, the analyst does not observe shelf-space allocations for consumer goods (such data are
not collected on a frequent basis). To make eﬃcient use of the available data, the analyst must
therefore make reasonable assumptions about the behavior of each retailer r =1 ,...,K.For example,
it could be assumed that when setting shelf-space, each retailer acts in part independently and in
part imitates those retailers with whom it competes. A formalization of such an assumption proceeds
9as follows. Denote unobserved retailer support or shelf space allocation for good j by retailer r by
Sjr and array all such allocations into the K × 1 vector Sj. Then,
Sj =
(K×1)
λWSj + ηj. (3)
In this equation, retailer support Sj (e.g., shelf space allocation) is a linear function of the weighted
average, WSj, of retailer support at competing retailers. The coeﬃcient λ measures the strength
of the eﬀect of competing retailers. The terms ηj represent the idiosyncratic component of retailer
behavior. This model of retail support can be written as a reduced form of the idiosycratic terms by





This model can be interpreted as a spatially-autoregressive model of retail support. The vector Sj
is random from the perspective of the analyst because the idiosyncratic shocks ηj are not observed.
However, if the shocks can be assumed to have a parametric distribution, the eﬀects of Sj can be
estimated. For instance, if the innovations ηjr are normally distributed with mean 0 and variance
σ2
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The random eﬀects Sj (which are at the retailer level) can help in measuring spatial concentration of
brand performance across markets by mapping the retailer trade areas to the markets. To exemplify
this, suppose we are interested in modeling market shares vjm of product j in market m, as a function
of a 1 × P vector of exogenous variables xjm,m=1 ,...,M and the random eﬀects Sj. To translate
the Sj to the market level deﬁne a retail-structure matrix H of size M × K which lists the ACV
based market share of retailer r in market m (H is sparse). Stacking over markets, we model
vj =
(M×1)
xjα + βHSj + ej (6)
where the eﬀects α are responses to the exogenous variables (it is possible to estimate other eﬀects
than common-eﬀects α but we do not discuss such elaborations here) and the scalar β is the eﬀect
of the unobserved retail variables such as shelf-space. The M × 1 vector HSj contains the market
averages of the unobserved retailer variables. We assume that ej is a set of IID residuals that are
10normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2
e. These residuals are also independent of the Sj.
We can rearrange the last equation to
vj − xjα =
(M×1)
βHSj + ej. (7)
Estimation of this model proceeds by realizing that the right hand side is a Normally distributed
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η and β can not be identiﬁed separately).
It is instructive to observe that two sources of spatial dependence are present in this model. First,
the contagion among retailers, λ, creates that the inﬂuence of a given retailer spreads beyond its
own territory. Second, when this contagion is absent, λ = 0, the variance covariance matrix in the
model reduces to β2σ2
ηHH0 + σ2
eIM. In this case, the oﬀ-diagonals in HH0 will account for spatial
dependence due to the multimarket presence of —independent— retailers.
This discussion implies that in the analysis of multimarket data, even when consumers do not
travel from market to market, dependencies across markets will often emerge because of spatial
dependences in unobserved retailer behavior.
3.4 Direct measures of spatial concentration across markets
Another often used model to express the dependence of data across markets relies on a direct mea-
surement of spatial dependence (see, e.g., Anselin 1988). Rather than using a factor model such
as equation (3) to build the spatial dependence matrix from the areas over which retailers exercise
direct control, one can take a more statistical perspective and, analogous to the temporally autore-
gressive model, directly model spatial dependence based on for instance distance or contiguity (see
also Edling and Liljeros 2003). In the latter approach, a contiguity matrix C of size M × M is
deﬁned (M is the number of markets). Each row m of this matrix identiﬁes which markets m0 6= m
are neighbors of market m. Various deﬁnitions of neighborship or contiguity exist. The deﬁnition of
contiguity that most frequently used empirically with irregularly spaced data is based on so-called
Voronoi polygons (e.g., e.g. Okabe et al. 2000). These polygons use the (irregular, i.e., non-lattice)
location of markets to exhaustively divide the US geography into mutually exclusive market areas. A
contiguity-set for a given market is then constructed by the set of all markets areas that are adjacent
to the area of the market under study. The contiguity-set of a market is called its spatial lag operator
(in analogy to approaches in time series analysis). If the rows of the matrix C add to 1, the matrix
11C is said to be standardized. Denote the number of neighbors of market m by Nm. In this paper,
we use a standardized matrix C, with C(m,m0) = 0 if the two markets are not neighbors, and with
C(m,m0)=1 /Nm if m and m0 are adjacent.
A model of spatially dependent market shares for brand j is than deﬁned by the following variance
components model
vj = xjα + ξjβ + ej,
ξj = λCξj + ηj (8)
with both ej and ηj are M × 1 vectors of independently normally distributed variables with mean
0a n dv a r i a n c eσ2
e and 1 respectively. This model is known as a spatially autoregressive model with
autoregression parameter λ. For various technical properties of this model see, e.g., LeSage (2000).
Using a standardized matrix C, the spatial lag of a given observation can be interpreted as the
(weighted) average of the observations at neighboring locations. The model thus basically allows
for the possibility that the average of neighboring ob s e r v a t i o n si si n f o r m a t i ve about the observation
under investigation.
Turning back to the model, and taking ξj on the left hand side, we obtain that ξj =( IM − λC)
−1 ηj.
The model above can therefore be statistically formulated as
vj − xjα = ξjβ + ej, (9)
where the right hand side is distributed Multivariate Normal with mean 0 and variance covariance
matrix equal to β2 (IM − λC)
−1 (IM − λC)
−10 +σ2
eIM. Whereas this model has the same number of
parameters as the model in equation (7) it implies a diﬀerent type of spatial dependence. Speciﬁcally,
the model based on retailer networks accounts for the geographical constellation of retailer trade
areas, whereas the market-contiguity model is purely based on proximity.
3.5 An empirical example
The models (7) and (9) can be estimated from multimarket data. To provide a simple empirical
example of their performance, we use Information Resources Inc. (IRI) optical-scanner supermarket
data from 64 local markets, sampled from the entire continental United States. Markets are deﬁned
by IRI as a metropolitan area (e.g., Los Angeles) or a combination of metropolitan areas (e.g.,
Raleigh-Durham). In all cases, markets are suﬃciently distant from each other that the assumption
12of absence of arbitrage is very reasonable in the case of consumer packaged goods. The data that we
have at our disposal are at the market level and cover sales, prices, and indicators of the presence
of promotion displays and feature ads (store ﬂyer ads). For illustration purposes, we calibrate our
models on a cross-sectional sample dating from 1995 of 64 observations of market shares, prices,
promotion display intensity, and feature intensity (computed as the fraction of time and market
volume that a given brand is on display or is featured). We transformed the data by taking natural
logs so that regression constants may be interpreted as elasticities. The data analyzed herein are
from the largest brand of Mexican Salsas in the United States, Pace.
To estimate the model, we also need data on retailer trade-areas and location of markets. Specif-
ically, to compute the matrix W,w en e e dd a t ao nt h et o t a lv o l u m e( A C V rm) of all retailers in the
64 IRI markets. These data were obtained from TradeDimension in New York, who maintains a data
base of retail-chains, that includes their location and local size of operation. To compute the matrix
C we used the latitude and longitude data of the locations of the IRI markets, and a MATLAB
function to compute the Voronoi tessellation of space on which contiguity is deﬁned.
To estimate the models, we maximized the log of the normal likelihood under three diﬀerent
models. The ﬁrst model (base) is a base model for which the coeﬃcient β is contrained to be 0.
This creates a standard regression model with IID residuals. The second model (mkt) is the model
in equation (9) that is based on market contiguity. Finally, the third model (chain) is the model in
equation (7) and is based on chain level random eﬀects and contagion across chains. The results of
the three models are in Table 1.
The parameters in the base model have the intuitive pattern. The price elasticity is negative,
while the promotion eﬀects are positive.
The mkt model shows a high autoregression constant λ. This implies that local averages are
informative about the process at the location under investigation and suggests that the data are
spatially dependent. However, the importance of the spatial component is relatively low (β =
0.11). Note the eﬀects of price and promotion are estimated to be lower when spatial dependence is
accounted for. Within the conﬁnes of this single example, the improvement in loglikelihood over the
base model is modest.
Finally, when accounting for the geographical structure of the US retail industry through the
chain model, we ﬁnd that the spatial component in the data becomes quite important (β =0 .41).
13The parameter λ is lower than in the mkt model, because part of the spatial dependence is already
accounted for through the matrix H which lists the market share of each retailer in each market.
The loglikelihood of the chain model is better than the two other models.
Table 1: Maximum likelihood estimates (t-statistics)
Model
base mkt chain
α0 1.79 (3.4) 0.83 (1.5) 0.82 (1.8)
αprice -3.20 (-3.8) -2.33 (-3.7) -2.37 (-4.1)
αdisplay 0.21 (3.7) 0.09 (1.4) 0.10 (2.4)
αfeature 0.14 (3.8) 0.12 (1.4) 0.06 (1.6)
λ — 0.90 (8.5) 0.67 (4.0)
β — 0.11 (7.8) 0.41 (6.9)
σ2
e 0.32 (11.03) 0.24 (1.5) 0.06 (1.8)
loglikelihood -16.94 -14.40 -1.42
We have illustrated that spatial concentration exists and outlined two methods through which it
can be measured. Within the conﬁnes of our data, it seems (1) that spatial concentration in these data
is substantial, (2) that the spatial component in the data seems consistent with unobserved retailer
conduct and (3) that it is necessary to account for this structure when analyzing multimarket data.
Especially the second ﬁnding is interesting. Essentially, the second point states that after accounting
for price, display and feature eﬀects, the unobserved components left in the data are mostly consistent
with retailer level variation.
The following sections discuss theoretical perspectives that help to explain why spatial concen-
tration emerges and why it generally persists.
4 Path dependent growth processes: the interaction of geography
(space) and history (time)
In this section, we discuss two path-dependent processes of growth. Both processes partly explain
the emergence of spatial concentration of market share data. The ﬁrst process oﬀers a spatial
and network diﬀusion perspective on how retailers adopt new products (leading to local rollouts),
while the second process concentrates on how consumers learn about new products based on past
experiences.
144.1 Spatial and network diﬀusion in retail distribution
New product diﬀusion research has been important in marketing (see, e.g., Bass, 1969). However, the
diﬀusion literature in marketing has almost uniquely focused on temporal patterns of sales growth (see
e.g., Mahajan, Muller and Bass, 1995). Recently, spatial and spatiotemporal patterns of diﬀusion
have become the subject of empirical study (e.g., Bronnenberg and Mela 2002, Vandenbulte and
Lilien 2001). In addition to empirical methods, an other way to study spatial diﬀusion is by using
diﬀerential equations derived from theoretical models (Edling and Liljeros, 2003). Recently, also
simulation studies using aggregations of micro-level agents or decision makers have been used to
model spatial diﬀusion (see e.g., Lomi et al. 2003 for additional references). However, we focus
on empirical models. Bronnenberg and Mela (2002) develop a two stage model of new product
assortment-adoption by retailers. The ﬁrst stage captures how manufacturers roll out the new
product and enter local markets. The second stage models how retailers adopt a brand given that it
is available in at least one market that is part of its territory. A basic version of this model can be
stated as follows.
Manufacturer’s market-entry Denote the presence of the brand in a market by a dummy
variable yimt,w h e r ei =1 ,...,I indexes brands, m =1 ,...,M indexes markets, and t =1 ,...,T
indexes time.
Entry into market m by manufacturer i in week t can be formalized as a probit model, i.e.,
Pr(yimt =1 )=
(
Φ(Uimt)i f yimt−1 =0
1e l s e
. (10)
in which Uimt deterministic function and Φ is the cumulative standard Normal distribution. Spatial
dependence of manufacturer rollout can be introduced in this model by making Uimt a function of
whether i’s brand was launched in neighboring markets m0 i nt h ep a s tt i m ep e r i o d s . U s i n gt h e
deﬁnition of the matrix C from the previous section, and arraying the market entry variables of
t − 1 across markets into the M × 1 vector yit−1, as p a t i a le ﬀect on the local entry decisions can
be operationalized as the mth element of the spatially and temporally lagged market entry variables
C · yit−1.D e n o t i n g t h e mth row of C by cm, the weighted average of past entry in neighboring
m a r k e t si st h u scm·yit−1.
Another variable that inﬂuences spatial concentration and aﬀects market-entry is the sum of
market shares in market m of chains who adopted manufacturer i0sn e wb r a n di na n ym a r k e tm0 6= m
prior to t. This variable captures the degree to which retailers on a given market already carry the
15new brand in other markets. This variable can be deﬁned on the basis of the matrix H (deﬁned
previously as the M by K matrix H containing the ACV share of chain k in market m). Write
the mth row of H by hm. Denote the distribution status of brand i by zikt =1i fc h a i nk adopted
before or in week t, and zikt = 0 if the chain did not adopt up until week t. Array across chains to
obtain a K ×1 vector zit. Then, the total share of chains on market m that are already carrying the
brand in other markets m0 6= m is equal to the mth element of H · zit−1, which is equal to hm·zit−1.
To summarize, the adoption function Uimt above contains (potentially among other variables) the
following components
Uimt = αi + γ1cm·yit−1 + γ2hm·zit−1
Retailer adoption The second stage of the model focuses on the retailer’s decision to adopt the
brand in its assortment. As before, this decision can be represented as a probit model. Adoption can
only occur if the brand is made available by the manufacturer in at least one market that belongs to
chain k’s territory. Deﬁning the moment of earliest entry into the trade area of retailer k by tavail
k ,
and the moment of ﬁrst time adoption by the retailer by t
adopt





0i f t<t avail
k
Φ(Vikt)i f tavail







in which the terms Vikt capture the attractiveness of brand i to retailer k at week t, and the function
Φ is the again the cumulative standard Normal distribution. Of interest in this model is whether
retailer adoption decisions depend on similar decisions made by its direct rivals. As outlined in
the previous section, such an eﬀect can be introduced as a network eﬀect. Implementation in the
adoption model proceeds by making attractiveness Vikt dependent on past adoption by rival retailers.
Rival retailers are identiﬁed by the K × K matrix W (deﬁned previously) whose rows add to one,
and whose entries [k,k0]a r e0i fk and k0 do not compete in the same geographic markets and
positive if they do compete directly. Also deﬁne the kth row of W as wk. To deﬁne the diﬀusion
variable of retailer adoption, array the K distribution variables zikt−1 at t − 1 across markets into
the K × 1 vector zit−1. Next, the value of the diﬀusion variable is the kth element of the spatially
and temporally lagged chain adoption variables W · zit−1. For each retailer k this variable assumes
the value wk·zit−1. These variables can be interpreted as weighted averages of past adoptions by
competing retailers. The weights capture the degree of inﬂuence by each direct competitor in one’s
trade area. Thus, a model for Vikt would contain (among other components)
16Vikt = θi + γ3wk·zit−1
Bronnenberg and Mela (2002) use chain and market level data from the Frozen Pizza industry and
ﬁnd evidence for the spatial (geographic), selection, and network (retailer) eﬀects that are implied by
the eﬀects γ1 −γ3 respectively.. Further, it was found that retailer adoption and manufacturer roll-
out reinforce eachother. This means that lead-market selection is non-trivial in the sense that brands
diﬀuse faster from some markets than others. Bronnenberg and Mela (2002) ﬁnd that attractive lead
markets are those that are on a common edge of multiple large retailer trade areas.
Obviously, this work does not stand alone, but is a part of an existing stream of empirical
studies in network and spatial diﬀusion. For instance, the seminal paper by Strang and Tuma (1993)
provides alternative measures of spatial and social contagion. Wasserman and Faust (1994) give a
very complete overview of social contagion variables. VandenBulte and Lilien (2001) argue that it is
important to test for rival explanations for social contagion. In a reanalysis of the famous data from
Coleman, Katz and Menzel (1966), they show that interpretations of contagion can be confounded
with marketing mix activity such as sales-calls or advertising. In marketing, other studies have found
that market characteristics, culture and demographic details, number of urban conglomerations and
similarities between countries and size or importance of the old technology inﬂuence international
diﬀusion. (Dekimpe, Parker and Sarvary, 2000). Network diﬀusion, which started with research
on innovations (e.g., Valente, 1995) and on sociology (e.g., Wasserman and Faust, 1994), attempts
to formalize the links between the diﬀerent participants in the network and explain the diﬀusion
process.
4.2 Order of entry and consumer learning
Spatial concentration can emerge from the combination of consumer learning processes and local
order-of-entry (the latter is implied by the model above). That is, order-of-entry in a certain market
inﬂuences consumer preferences if such preferences follow a learning process that is based on past
experience. For instance, in product categories in which consumer preferences are initially diﬀuse
(e.g., high tech products, discontinuous innovations), several studies found that consumer preferences
are not exogenous but are formed on the basis of an anchoring-and-adjustment process (Kahneman,
Slovic and Tversky, 1982; Kahneman and Snell 1990). In this process, consumers learn about their
17own preferences from the available choice options. In a similar context, Carpenter and Nakomoto
(1989) ﬁnd that, over time, the ideal point of the consumer (i.e., what the consumer wants) tends to
shift toward the pioneer’s location in perceptual space. In eﬀect, the pioneer becomes the prototype
for the category and an asymmetric product comparison process emerges between the pioneer and
later entrants (see also Tversky 1977).
An eﬀective model of path dependent preferences is given by P´ olya (1931). In this model, a
consumer’s choice history is represented by an urn with diﬀerent brands represented by balls of
diﬀerent colors (say two for simplicity). For discussion, suppose the balls are either red or green. At
time t = 0 the urn contains G0 green and R0 red balls.
The characteristic process that gives rise to P´ olya’s urn is that balls are randomly drawn from
the urn with replacement of B additional balls of the last drawn color. As an example, if at t =0 ,
G0 = R0 = B =1 , then at t =1 , we replace a red draw with 2 red balls and a green draw with
2g r e e nb a l l s . A tt =1 , both these events happen with equal likelihood. However, at t =2 , the
likelihood of drawing either a red or a green ball depends on the previous draw and favors the color
that was drawn at t = 1. As more and more balls are added to the urn, the odds of drawing either
red or green keep changing depending on all past draws. However, it is readily veriﬁed that as the
number of the balls in the urn increases, the proportion of green (or red) balls in the urn will become
constant. In other words, there exists a stable distribution of the long-run share of green balls in the
urn. P´ olya (1931) proved that this distribution is a Beta distribution with parameters parameters
G0/B and R0/B.
Figure 3 illustrates. Each panel in this ﬁgure gives the distribution density of the long term
proportion of green balls in the urn (between 0 and 1). Moving across panels horizontally, the
expected proportion for green remains constant at G0/(G0+R0), i.e., 0.5 in the top graphs and 0.33
in the bottom graphs.
The growth rate B increases across the panels from left to right. The associated distribution of
the equilibrium proportion for G/(G + R) goes from unimodal (suggesting a tendency to stay close
to the initial conditions) to U-shaped (suggesting a tendency for one color to dominate). Ex ante,
the expectations for the share of green are identical. However, the variance of these expectations is
higher when the growth rate is high compared to the size of entry (the initial conditions). Moreoever,
when the growth rate is high enough, the urn becomes “tippy” in the sense that one color tends to
















































































Figure 3: Density of the long-term market share of the “green product” in the P´ olya urn.
dominate (shares of 0 or 1 are most likely).
As stated, this process can operate as a representation of path-dependent consumer preferences,
especially when buying behavior is based on past choices. The contents in the urn substitutes for
experience of the consumer in the category at hand. The parameter B can be seen as a learning
parameter which controls the speed of updating preferences for the brands that have been purchased
in the past. The steady-state distributions now represent brand preferences. The model captures
both those consumers who repurchase out of inertia (those that update “fast” so that they either
favor one brand or another) or consumers who consider more brands (those that update “slower”).
Another appealing characteristic of this interpretation is that updating of preferences occurs most
when the consumer is inexperienced. Purchase feedback becomes less informative when the consumer
gains experience.
This model predicts that in a market with “P´ olya consumers,” early entrants will generally
end up with larger market shares than later entrants. This is the case because initial choices are
reinforced in this process. Furthermore, successful entry and inﬂuencing consumer preferences for
new brands becomes harder after a critical amount of learning has taken place. This is because
preferences change less and less as experience grows. Implicitly, the P´ olya urn implies that there is
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Tostitos Salsa
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Old El Paso Salsa
min:0.09   max:0.50
Las Palmas Salsa
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Figure 4: Spatial variability of market shares for undiﬀerentiated goods
an opportunity window outside of which it is diﬃcult and more expensive to enter the market.
Together, the feedback model of retailer distribution and market rollout, and the model of path-
dependent consumer learning are consistent with the emergence of spatial concentration of market
shares. The following section addresses two mechanisms of why spatial concentration of market
shares tends to persist.
5 Marketing strategy and sustenance of spatial concentration in
brand shares
Spatial concentration of market shares once established often persists. For instance, Figure 4 visu-
alizes local market shares (averaged over two years of weekly data) for four brands of Mexican Salsa
across sixty-four diﬀerent geographical markets in the United States. The weekly market shares
are stable across time. It is an interesting puzzle that in the face of this apparent lack of product
diﬀerentiation, the observed market share diﬀerences can be sustained. Below, we discuss two broad
theories that may help to explain this puzzle.
205.1 Spatial distributions of consumer tastes and path-dependence
Cconsumers may not be homogeneously distributed across space (in either quantity or type). If
consumers are immobile (i.e., if intermarket distances are large enough), the P´ olya process leads to
local preferences that reﬂect the entry decisions by brands at the market level. If the P´ olya process
becomes a representation of the market, the ex ante prediction of long term share of a brand would
be a random draw from the Beta distribution with parameters based on initial conditions. Note from
Figure 3 that therefore market shares can stabilize around diﬀerent values in diﬀerent locations. In
this explanation, the variation in market shares across markets is caused by the fact that the growth
process takes diﬀerent (sample)-paths in markets with diﬀerent order-of-entry patterns.
The stability of the market structure or the persistence of concentration is caused by the fact
that the Polya process will “lock in” a certain division of market shares after a growth process during
which the markets are in ﬂux. A deﬁning characteristic of this explanation (at least in its pure form)
for spatial concentration is that ﬁrms can not change the market structure once it has locked in.
Although consumer mobility can be used to explain the diﬀerences in shares across large distances,
to a lesser degree consumer mobility even impacts retailer price-discrimination strategies at the
neighborhood level as well. For instance, retailers charge higher prices in neighborhoods that have
more consumers with higher travel cost or lower mobility (Hoch et al 1995).
5.2 Multi-market contact
In addition to the lock-in of market shares in path-dependent models, another reason for why spa-
tial concentration may persist is that it is beneﬁcial for the manufacturers to sustain it. In this
interpretation, spatial concentration is the outcome of manufacturer competition when consumers
are immobile. Especially if ﬁrms compete in many markets, it is a priori not clear whether they are
better oﬀ dividing the universal market geographically into local markets with low and high market
power, or, conversely, having symmetric market shares in all markets. Anderson, de Palma and
Thisse (1992) show that within-market competition becomes more and more ﬁerce as the diﬀerenti-
ation of brands becomes less in the eyes of consumers. In such cases, multi-market contact among
t h es a m es e to fﬁrms could achieve that ﬁrms maintain a pre-existing diﬀerentiation on the basis of
geography (i.e., exploit the lack of consumer arbitrage across markets). This mutual forebearance
hypothesis was introduced Bernheim and Whinston (1990) and has since received much attention in
21the literature on economics and strategy (e.g., Baum and Greve 2001).
Directly related to the data in Figure 4 is a proposition by Karnani and Wernerfelt (1985).
They introduce a so-called “mutual foothold” equilibrium in which ﬁrms take a large lead in some
geographic markets but maintain a small position in other markets. This small position (the foothold)
allows the locally small ﬁrm to inﬂict damage on attackers in its large markets. Mutual footholds
then suﬃce to keep all players from attacking each other in the markets where they are large. For
the top three brands in the Mexican Salsa category this seems a feasible explanation for why the
brands do not exit the markets in which they have sometimes very small market shares.
Another strategic yet rather diﬀerent reason for asymmetric market power in local markets is
to allow that some product-unrelated source of diﬀerentiation is under control of ﬁrms. Yarrow
(1989), using a duopoly model of logit demand, shows the existence of three candidate equilibria
when ﬁrms ﬁrst set advertising and then prices. One of these candidates is a symmetric equilibrium,
while the two remaining candidates are mirror images of an asymmetric market outcome in which
one ﬁrm advertises more than the other and has a higher proﬁt margin. Yarrow (1989) characterizes
the existence conditions for these candidate equilibria, and ﬁnds that the asymmetric equilibrium is
unique when the product category is undiﬀerentiated whereas both the existence and the uniqueness
of the symmetric equilibrium requires a lower-threshold of product diﬀerentiation. This means that
as long as product categories are well diﬀerentiated symmetric ﬁrms will compete with symmetric
outputs (in each market). However, when the danger of ruinous price competition looms large in
cases of undiﬀerentiated goods, symmetric ﬁrms may compete by creating diﬀerentiation based on
advertising investments. A surprising aspect of Yarrow’s analysis is that the asymmetric equilibrium
can be sustained even in a single market.
In sum, while some geographic markets are similar in aspects such as size, prices, consumer
characteristics, etc., the associated market structures can be diﬀerent. For example, a market may
be highly concentrated, with one brand having a large share, while other markets may have numerous
brands ﬁghting aggressively. It is important to understand the reasons why markets evolve like they
do and what makes one brand so predominant in one region but less signiﬁcant in others. In this
context, it is fortuitous that empirical data are becoming available to test alternative models of
product-growth and market-structure.
226 Conclusions
Geographical space is an important ingredient of marketing strategy and marketing practice. Con-
sumer immobility, transportation cost of the ﬁrm, advertising “markets,” retailer trade areas, dis-
tribution channels, etc. are all ingredients that make a case for the relevance of physical space in
marketing and strategy. Spatial price discrimination, sustenance of asymmetric market power, etc.,
are likely an outcome of using geographical space as a source of diﬀerentiation in competition even
when product diﬀerentiation is not enough to sustain proﬁts. Despite this, currently, geographical
space is not an important ingredient in the academic tradition of theory building in marketing or
economics. Indeed, much theory building in marketing concentrates on within-market research ques-
tions. We hope that this chapter is instructive in suggesting ways in which spatial growth of new
products and spatially concentrated outcomes of these growth processes can be modeled.
At least three avenues for future empirical research seem important. The ﬁrst should focus
on descriptive models of spatial growth. Research that combines both temporal and spatial data
for the study of such models is scarce, but the data have recently become available in packaged
goods. Second, not much work has been done to analyse the observed diﬀerences in within ﬁrm
marketing strategy across markets. Indeed, multimarket data provide a great opportunity to study
ﬁrm decision making with respect to advertising and pricing decisions within and across markets. A
ﬁnal area in which spatial analysis can play a major role in theory building is work on positioning
new products in the attribute space. The Defender model (Hauser and Shugan, 1983) is one of the
most used approaches to position new products and defend incumbents in marketing. It makes use
of a perceptual map where each brand is deﬁned by the location of two attributes and consumers
have a preference distribution on those attributes. Elrod (1988) developed the model to identify the
positions of the brands in a perceptual map from panel data. The implications of such and other
“address” models of product positioning are only currently being uncovered (see e.g., Berry and
Pakes 2001).
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